How the Government has failed the British Close Protection Industry

Rich H

The following post is copyrighted material in its entirety


Since the introduction of licensing in the UK in 2006 I have been frustrated with the initial core competency framework of the National Occupational Standards, (NOS), and Accreditation of Prior Learning, (APL), as set by the British Governments Security Industry Authority, (sia). I subsequently authored a research report – An Examination of the Required Operational Skills and Training Standards for a Close Protection Officer in the United Kingdom and have persistently lobbied for changes directly to the Home Office, The Cabinet Office, The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Skills For Security and the SIA themselves. The sole aim - to raise the decided standards and implement a more reality driven framework for the basis of APL, Close protection training, operational standards, and the employment practise of CP Officers in the UK. In 2008, I was selected as a member of the Expert Consultation Group for reviewing the NOS. After the first meeting I became further infuriated at the disjointed organisation of the criteria process for reviewing the standards, the bureaucracy involved to implement change to the core competency framework and the overall disinterest by both organisations that should be involved in rectifying omissions and the wrongs with both the NOS and APL. I then authored the Close Protection National Occupational Standards Review Report 2008, a review with strong recommendations for change to both the NOS and APL and submitted the report to all those government and commercial organisations as before. I then removed himself from the Expert Consultation Group in protest.

BACKGROUND TO THE SIA

Before we can analyse the standards one must attain for eligibility of a compulsory license, as stipulated by the SIA, we must first discuss the background of the SIA prior to the implementation of licensing Close Protection.
Statutory regulation in the form of the Private Security Industry Act, 2001 was passed as a result of rising public concern surrounding the criminal activities of various individuals and companies, earning a living in what has been generically termed the Security Industry. The Security Industry Authority, (SIA), an independent government body that reports to the Home Secretary, was established in 2003 and is the organisation responsible for regulating the private security industry in the UK; Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), Cash and Valuables in Transit (CVIT), Door Supervision, Events Security, Key Holding, Private Investigation, Security Consultancy, Security Guarding, Vehicle Immobilisation and Close Protection. According to the SIA's 2003 strategic analysis, (SIA: 2006), the annual revenue of the UK's private security industry is between £3 billion to £4 billion, and there are around half a million security operatives working within the industry. This compares to approximately 136,000 police officers.

The need for regulation

There is little doubt that security is an economically and politically important industry. Unfortunately, the industry has suffered with a bad reputation. “Commoditisation needs to stop. The industry must be more proactive about what it sells - and how it sells it - by offering real solutions to real security problems. Providers must look to more innovative use of people and technology, developing alliances with third parties, and encouraging a greater level of professionalism”, (SIA, 2006). Licensing for people working in private security came into effect across England and Wales on 20 March 2006. Anyone involved in providing contracted Close Protection services requires a licence. This includes employees, managers, supervisors and directors or partners of security companies.
The SIA does not approve or vet training providers directly. They do, however, operate a voluntary approved contractor scheme for purposes to “Raise performance standards and to assist the private security industry in developing new opportunities”, (SIA, 2006). The Private Security Industry Act 2001 requires the SIA to establish a "System of inspection for providers of security services, under which those organisations who satisfactorily meet the agreed standards may be registered as approved, and may advertise themselves as such", (SIA, 2006). The SIA does not run training courses or give qualifications or provide funding. Instead, they have endorsed awarding bodies who offer the qualifications linked to SIA licensing and approve training providers.

Three awarding bodies offer qualifications linked to Close Protection licensing: Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College, Edexcel and City & Guilds.
But, before we discuss the licensing process however, we must first analyse the history of security related qualifications pre and post the formation of the SIA. A complicated system but one that illustrates the associations with, and subsequent influences on, decisions made by the SIA concerning security qualifications and licensing of the private security industry.

Security qualifications background

The security industry has always had, as most industries do a “governing” body. The British Security Industry Association Ltd (BSIA) was formed in 1967 by the security industry itself. As time progressed and the private sectors role changed the BSIA saw the need to make the industry more professional so they formed a training company in 1990. That company was the Security Industry Training Organisation Ltd or ‘SITO’. The two companies have common directors and the BSIA is the holding and parent company. In addition to training, SITO was also a recruitment company for the higher levels of the industry. SITO changed its name to Skills For Security Ltd (S4S) and some of the Directors of the BSIA are also Directors of S4S.

When the BSIA set up SITO in 1990 there were no qualifications available in security, so between them they designed and devised some and had them accredited through the Open College Network, South Yorkshire & Humberside. When the qualifications were accredited by OCN they were protected by SITO/S4S so that only they could access them. This means that all the qualifications are effectively owned by the BSIA through their ownership of SITO/S4S. Those who deliver security training in the UK have to be approved by SITO/S4S and South Yorkshire & Humberside OCN. The process of accreditation is very simple and of a very low standard. A training provider would naturally assume that once they have gone through the accreditation process then they would have full access to other OCN qualifications. This is not the case. Once accredited through SITO/S4S it only gives access to the security qualifications. To access other qualifications you have to become a full and proper member of OCN and the accreditation standards are very high. So therefore, a 2 tier system exists with the security system being much lower than the standard one would expect.

In 2001 the SIA is formed and subsequently implemented licensing. The industry was aware of the future as the opinion of the BSIA had been sought during the set up phase by the Home Office who of course, the SIA report to. As one can see, an imposed licensing system exists, by Government, who has been advised by the BSIA, (and S4S), who own the qualifications through OCN who have lowered their normal standards. This means that all the larger companies are training centers accredited by OCN and can deliver in house training and qualifications. Considering one of the larger companies that employ 10,000, the cost of training alone is considerable and the implications of taking the staff out from normal duties to train over a 4 or 5 day period is even larger. So the solution and the cost effective approach is to compromise the time and standard of training there by lowering the cost to them selves, which is significant.

The OCN are the largest award body for Security Guarding, and the only awarding body for Cash & Valuables in Transit and a major award body for CCTV training. These qualifications should be available through any OCN region in the UK to any training provider that has been an accredited centre under the full and proper accreditation scheme. That is not possible and what the industry is forced to do is access them through S4S which is a private limited company owned by the BSIA and in turn owned by the major players in the security industry. “One of the issues that has become apparent to me is that due to the various associations formed as a result of the SIA needing help from the industry is that they have become part of a cartel by association and this is a major issue for the SIA as they are an agency that reports directly to the Home Office”, (Name withheld, 2006).

This of course, could be a separate writing in itself. However, one can clearly see that even with solely considering the area of licensing the Close Protection sector, that consultation with the commercial world will predominantly lead to biased opinion due to vested interests of economic and business gain - financial income and commerce opportunity. Consequently, decisions made by persons of the SIA with no personal subject matter knowledge, and based on advice, information and recommendations given by parties influenced by such factors, will be liable to being inaccurate, ineffective and biased.


Licensing limitations

It must be appreciated that the list of core competencies are based solely around CP operations within the UK, hence, the obvious absence of weapons training and related disciplines. In light of this, it must also be made aware the absence of unarmed combat training related to the protection of a third party, which is very relevant to operating in the UK as elsewhere. The nearest description one can find relating to the subject is one of ‘Control and Restraint’ in ‘National Occupational Standards for Close Protection, Skills For Security’, under the heading, ‘Unit PCP 9, Control and Restraint to support Close Protection’. ‘Control and Restraint’ (C & R) is terminology predominantly used by the Police, Prison Service and Health Service in the use of arrest and detention applications and can be defined as, ‘A method used to safely restrain a person that poses a serious risk to the health and safety of themselves or others’, (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2006). C & R consists of holds and releases from holds and restraint positions. Therefore, should a CPO be providing protection on his own as an individual bodyguard (IBG) and they and their ‘protectee’ be confronted by multiple assailants, i.e. more than one; - Who is providing the protection when the assailant is being restrained by the bodyguard? Indeed, if we simplify the scenario further by reducing to just one assailant - how long should the BG restrain the assailant? For, if he is to release the restraint, the apprehended individual becomes an assailant once more. The Principal is certainly not going to wait until the Police arrive on scene. It is imperative that the bodyguard must know how to handle those using verbal and physical attack whilst controlling and protecting the Principal at the same time. The only method to be adopted is the gradual escalation and application of force that is reasonable on another, in direct relation to the force, or threat of force, being received and remaining within the constraints of the law. This can legally involve pre-emptive strikes. The legal definition of self-defence is; ‘Use of force is justified when a person reasonably believes that it is necessary for the defence of oneself or another against the immediate use of unlawful force. However, a person must use no more force than appears reasonably necessary in the circumstances’, (Lectric Law Library, 2006).

‘Physical Intervention Skills’ is listed under ‘Skills for Employment’ by the SIA, but is not part of the core competencies, and states that this, ‘Must be determined by the training providers…and remains the responsibility of the employer and/ or training provider’, (SIA, 2006:5). In other words, this subject could be omitted in its entirety in commercial CP training with the newly qualified civilian CPO being absolutely untrained in any protection related or self-defence combat skills/ methods, other than control and restraint techniques. “In determining which competencies should be mandatory, the SIA has chosen not to include specific skills for employment such as physical intervention skills...”, (SIA, 2006). This is a disturbing fact when one considers the primary function of a close protection operative is to ensure the security and the safety of the Principal.

The importance of driving within the Close Protection World cannot be overstated. A large percentage of operational time is spent in vehicles and the conveyance of a Principal exposes them to risks of a safety nature thus increasing the number of risks as a whole, either direct or indirect, that are/ could be presented. The role of close protection driver therefore is vitally important. Police and Rmp Driving Schools utilise a system of car control referred to as Roadcraft. Driving safety and driving skill are aspects of the same ability – the ability to control the position and speed of your vehicle relative to everything else on the road. An accident or even a near miss usually represents a loss of this control – a lapse in driving skill. The role of Close Protection Driver within the Police is deemed important enough that the individual, although not in every case, but even though trained, does not carry a firearm. The reasoning behind such decisions is that should a ‘contact’ situation present itself, the driver should be concerned with driving and not with returning fire. According to Kent Police, CPO’s who are operating in the role as driver should be trained in how to:
• Identify hazards whilst driving in convoy
• Demonstrate effective observation skills
• Use safe driving techniques
• Correctly position a vehicle during convoy or Vip duties
• Approach and position a vehicle at venue locations correctly
• Use a vehicle defensively
• Search a vehicle for suspect packages
• Avoid ambush
• Plan a route and map read to principal venues

According to ‘Skills For Security’ and the SIA, driving within the role of Close Protection is not deemed important to be made mandatory training and is not listed in the core competencies one should attain. It does however, mention the use of ‘close- protection vehicle techniques’ but this specialist area is unbalanced in the list when one considers that basic driving skills should be first improved upon before one conducts such training. Another confusing aspect is that ‘PCP 7, National Occupational Standards’, does contain the heading, ‘Maintain the safety and security of Principal’s whilst in transit’, but only under the subject heading of, ‘Surveillance Awareness’, (SIA: 2006), and no where does it refer to the standard of driving to be attained. It is imperative to note that ‘Driving Skills’ is listed with ‘Physical Intervention Skills’; as ‘Skills for Employment’ and not as part of any mandatory SIA core competencies, and therefore not obligatory.


Accreditation of Prior Learning

Another important factor concerning decisions made is that although the licensing process does involve an ‘Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) and experience and is outlined by the SIA, (SIA: 2006), it does state however that;

“There are no QCA/ACCAC/QAA approved qualifications that can be considered as exemptions for the core competence training and assessment. Arrangements for exemptions and Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) are as follows:

1. Close Protection operatives who have previously received formal close protection training and are currently employed in an operational close protection role should present themselves to an approved Training Centre with evidence of the training they have received. Depending on the date and content of the training they have taken and to what extent the training covered the learning objectives of the new Close Protection course for licensing, they will be directed to take either the full 150 hours full Close Protection Course or the 24 hour Guided Learning Hours Refresher Course.

2. Candidates who have completed formal close protection training from the organisations listed below and have remained in an operational close protection role, will be exempt from further training but will be required to take the knowledge test and a practical skills assessment.
 Special Air Service regiment Bodyguard Course
 Royal Military Police Close Protection Course
 Metropolitan Police Royalty Protection/Special Branch Close Protection Course
 Police National close protection courses including Northern Ireland
 Nemesis Group Close Protection Course
 phoenix close protection Course”

It is therefore evident that these exemptions, as ultimately decided upon by the SIA, have not only bracketed 2 commercial training companies with them thus implying similar high training standards and operational values but have disregarded the true professionalism and expertise of such specialist units as the SAS, RMP, or members of Police units serving under ‘Protection Command’. As a result and for example, it is now mandatory for individuals who have been trained and had experience of CP operations with any of these specialist units to sit a written examination and be practically assessed on their knowledge of the subject matter before they can receive a SIA Close Protection license and be allowed to be legally employed in a commercial environment in the UK. Whether it is members of the RMP or SAS having served as bodyguards to senior military Generals or Members of Parliament/ Heads of State in high risk locations; or members of the Police serving on the close protection teams for the Prime Minister or Royal Family; all must be assessed by individuals less qualified and less experienced. Exam paper questions for the CP license, a bank of some 200 questions, have been compiled by the same individuals with no formal training. At present, a serving member of the Royal Military Police Close protection Teams can conduct bodyguard duties to a British Ambassador but is advised to have to attend 24 hours of ‘refresher training’ over 3 days and then have to sit an exam, run by and written by civilians with no formal training before he/ she can legally be employed in a similar role in civilian life.
The following question was posed to the Chief Executive, Skills for Security, and who was head of the steering committee during the consultation phase for licensing the Close Protection sector;
“Is it not right that change needs to be implemented due to specialist personnel trained to the highest degree in a specific discipline that are employed by the British Governments Foreign & Commonwealth Office for the protection of its Ambassadors, Members of Parliament, Heads of State, and yet are having to sit an assessment to claim their CP license? Is their level of training, expertise and experience at question?”
“No I cannot agree with this statement in its entirety. I would not disagree about the high training standards and levels of expertise that are achieved in both service and police training for CP work but this is specialist work within a specialist environment with all the safeguards of refresher training built in. The requirements of the SIA are for the civilian marketplace, restricted at the moment to England and Wales. So a very different environment and for CP operatives who do not have the powers that are divested to either the military or the police”, (‘Skills For Security’: 2006).
Close Protection courses held within the military do, and have to, cater for all environments. The environment can constantly change and therefore personnel are trained to adapt. Whether they are operational in a suit with a covert carriage of weapons or whether they carry overt wearing uniform, the core practise and methods of operation seldom change. It is the outward appearance, the 'image stamp' of the team that changes. The Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ statement contradicts that of the Ministry of Defence, (Army), concerning the RMP CP course; “The aim of the course is to train Service Police men or women to perform close protection duties in any environment”, (MOD, 2006). 'Safeguards' such as refresher training as the Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ refers to within the military or police framework, is concentrated on firearms, unarmed combat, driving and medical, of which only the latter bears any relationship to the 'core competence's stipulated by the SIA, and far outweighs any ‘First Aid at Work’ or First Person on Scene’ medical course as recognised by the SIA, as they include intravenous infusion and the use of defibrillators amongst other procedures. One must also accept that those trained to the highest level would quite easily be able to adapt and operate in a less demanding, less challenging environment with less tension, but certainly not vice versa.
The main reasoning stated by the SIA not to fully recognise the training by the RMP, SAS or Police and consider them as exempted from the core competence training and assessment is that those military or police qualifications are not QCA/ ACCAC/ QAA approved. There is nothing alarming or surprising with this statement as it is widely known that many military courses do not have a civilian equivalent. However, research was undertaken with the QCA directly with startling results; “The Qualifications Curriculum Authority does not have to approve the courses run by these agencies. The SIA could decide themselves if their course content maps that of the core competencies required by the SIA”, (Harris, Connelly, 2006). Could it be that the SIA are very much aware of this and yet instil an ‘It is not our responsibility’ attitude to the process?
SIA Steering Committee
During the SIA ‘Consultation phase’, a steering committee was formed with representatives from industry, (Commercial CP training and operation providers), and the Police. Members of this committee included directors from ‘Nemesis Group Ltd, Phoenix CP, and CTR Services, amongst others. Mr Peter Consterdine, Joint Chief Instructor of The British Combat Association was also conferred with. The main underlying phenomena is that the directors of these companies and others have no proper Close Protection training or experience. Indeed, both Nemesis and Phoenix CP, although have directors from an RMP and SAS background respectively, they themselves have not attended their relevant units Close Protection or Bodyguard course, and yet have provided advice and recommendations concerning training and licensing this specialist sector. Questions were posed to the director of Phoenix CP concerning the clarification of his background and how he came to sit on the committee during the consultation phase, to which he refused to comment. The Director of CTR Services, “…was invited to sit on the steering committee by Alan Martin, a member of SITO, (S4S), who was responsible for developing the National Occupational Standards, for the SIA licensing of the sector”, (CTR Services, 2006). The Director of CTR Services is also now the chairman for Skills for Security for Close Protection. Peter Consterdine is a 7th Dan Black Belt in Karate, and a former Great Britain and England Karate International. He was an instructor for Excel Security Ltd and is Operations and Training Director of his own risk management and security company, Chase Consultants Limited. He attended a civilian CP course with ‘CQB Services’ in 1986.
The Close Protection National Occupational Standards, (NOS), were established by S4S, (SITO), and from this, the core competencies determined that must be covered by training providers on Close Protection courses.
Peter Consterdine stated, “The 'steering' committee for CP didn't exist as such and was essentially, divided into 2 parts. The first part was the establishment of CP National Occupational Standards (NOS) and this was driven by SITO. They simply 'dusted off' an earlier work on this that I and some other people had put together in 1994/5. They circulated the new proposal to a number of people - the extent of which I don't know and only at the tail end did I get to see them and comment as there were some issues I wasn't happy with. Eventually, SITO went firm on the NOS which were approved by the Co-ordinating Group on 23 Nov 2004. From here, the second stage of the process began, which was for SITO to turn the NOS into Training Core Competencies”, (Consterdine, 2006).
Here, we can see then that the SIA had formed a steering committee for the consultation phase consisting of individuals, who either had a predominantly martial arts background, directors of commercial companies who it was either believed or assumed had specialist related protection backgrounds but in fact on the contrary, and also members who were simply invited to sit. Indeed, it appears that anyone who knew anyone could invite them to sit. “The main players all advised the SIA and awarding bodies during the set up phase - in reality the SIA would have been much better off talking to the RMP through the MOD as there would have been no agendas at all”, (Name withheld, 2006).
With no knowledge on CP the SIA have sought, listened to and adhered to, advice and information on Close Protection matters from individuals that are not deemed as experts in their field by the Governments own authority on such matters; the MOD; the Royal Military Police Close Protection Unit and 22SAS, and also Police Protection units. As a result, they have implemented measures concerning licensing that illustrates a severe lack of understanding of the subject matter as previously discussed. Both standards and training competencies had to be established. In a democratic society this means by committee, and in a community with strong minded individuals, everyone has to ‘push’ their view. So, having started to design a horse the finished product ends up with stripes, a long neck and two humps as did the CP competencies.

Senior Staff of the SIA consists of a Chief Executive and 5 board members, none of which have had any significant career history of responsibility associated with the private security industry. Backgrounds include corporate banking, IT, BAA, Prison Service, Police Complaints Authority and Director of Personnel for Vauxhall Motors, (SIA: 2006). Indeed, as reiterated, knowledge or experience concerning matters of a Close Protection nature was also non-existent within the SIA and so the importance of the formation of a steering committee was under-lined in order to devise the standards and testing required. One would quite rightly assume that in such an important step in the complexity surrounding this discipline that the experts of this profession would be first approached. Experts that could produce information, advice and recommendations concerning the standards to be adopted that would be accurate, effective and unbiased. After all, the SIA is a Government body; why not approach the relevant Government experts?

The Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ and head of the consultation committee of the SIA at the time stated that this did indeed occur; “RMP, 22SAS and Met Police were all actively involved in the consultation process which took place in 2004/2005”.

A difference in standards

The results of licensing, the core competencies to be attained and the rules concerning previous training do not concur with this statement and clear contradictory facts were not to be expected.
In order to understand the level and difference of standards attained by those serving in the RMP, SAS or Police protection units with those from the civilian/ commercial world and with whom would have completed a civilian Close Protection course, it is important to understand the typical individual who operates in this specialist area. Every member of a professional protection team from those mentioned units is trained to a standard which is arguably, unsurpassed. Prior to being selected for training, the individual would undoubtedly have had a strong military or police background, more often than not have served in some form of elite military or anti-terrorist/ firearms unit, in itself having completed rigorous selection procedures . They would have undergone stringent physical, medical and mental examinations and in some areas, psychometric testing and evaluation, and, during their training, would have been constantly assessed for proficiency and attitude. As a result, the personnel are motivated, pro-active, diligent, dependable, reliable and resourceful. They would be able to operate as an individual as well as in a tight knit team. They have disciplined characters and would also invariably, be of a mature age. In international Close Protection circles – they are widely respected as experts and the content and standard of personnel involved is arguably the highest in the world today. One would naturally assume therefore that the introduction of licensing Close Protection in the UK would merely present a paper exercise for those with such backgrounds. One would also assume that these units would have been approached for advice during the consultation phase on licensing CP. This indeed, for the most part, is not the case.

“The SIA have not consulted with us regarding the licensing of CP on any level. We have not received any paperwork whatsoever concerning this matter”, (Capt DM, Royal Military Police Close Protection Unit, 2006).

“I have investigated whether we had received any communiqué from the SIA concerning either consulting with us regarding Close Protection or providing information on the licensing process. This has all met with negative results”, (Maj SP, RMP CPU, 2006).
“The SIA have never consulted us. There is great concern from us with the SIA and the way they do things”, (SSGT CT, RMP CPU, 2006).

“The SIA have not contacted us for any advice or information concerning Close Protection. We have also not hosted any liaison or conducted meetings with any members of the SIA”, (Jon, 22 SAS, 2006).

With regards to the Police presence on the ‘steering committee’; “Training exemptions were decided in my absence and "appeared" in the SIA blurb. Yes, there were discussions but no conclusions in open forum of which I was aware”, (Name withheld: 2006)
These statements contradict that given by the head of the consultation committee and also those of the SIA, “We stand by our original response to your question that we consulted widely with the listed agencies and we are confident that those representing their fields were at the required level. We can add nothing further to our answer”.

An important contradiction given the total relevance of the subject matter and one that required an exact answer to understand the decisions made. The question posed; ‘Were specialist units such as the Royal Military Police, 22 SAS and Met Police protection units consulted directly during the decision making process in the 'consultation phase' and not by persons on the 'steering committee' who claimed to have worked in such units?’ It is worthy to note that the initial email reply given to this question was, “I am extremely busy at the moment but I will try and answer your questions within a week”, (Chief Executive, ‘Skills For Security’: 2006). An electronic tracker was placed on the email posing the initial question. During the following 6 days, the email was forwarded and opened in correspondence 34 times by 6 readers including members of the SIA and ‘Skills For Security’. Is it that this line of questioning caused concern?




It is fact that the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis holds the national responsibility for the personal protection within the UK of members of the Royal Family, HM Government and also for visiting heads of state, and specified government representatives. This is discharged through the Royalty Protection Department and Specialist Protection (formerly Special Branch). The (Cabinet Office) Executive Committee for the Protection of Royalty and Public Figures (RAVEC), with its Home Office, (Terrorism & Protection Unit (TPU)) lead, determines which individuals are protected and agrees appropriate security measures.

There is no little confidence in those who perform this specialist role; and the specialist training given to officers selected for these duties is over and above their powers as Constables and their experience in street duties and frequently other specialisms. They seek support from, and lead operations, with police forces throughout the UK, enjoy intelligence flows with diverse agencies, diplomatic representatives and appropriate organisations when overseas.

It is fair to opine, therefore, that the levels of professionalism and the tactical application of protection skills within the disciplined and “not for profit” police environment are of the highest order. Little surprise then, that a police representative – to represent the Police Standards & Skills Organisation (PSSO) – was invited to the consultation foray when national occupational standards (NOS) and training elements were to be determined by the SIA. Important to note, that this ‘representative’ had no remit to represent the views of the Commissioner or the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), but sought to “assist” the process – as opposed to “steer” - and to respond to any areas in which police specialist training or standards may be surpassed by the commercial (SIA) proposals. “Leaving specialist firearms, first aid, driving and knowledge of criminal law and procedure aside (not to mention operational experience in the eye of the national and international media), there was of course, no compromise”, (Name withheld, 2006).

Anecdotal evidence supports the military conclusions: police are trained to operate at a level far in excess of the SIA standards. Yet, an experienced officer, who has been charged with the personal protection of the Prime Minister in the UK and overseas, is security cleared in compliance with government vetting standards, is an accredited police trainer and ‘Cert Ed’, is not qualified to apply for the SIA licence without submitting himself – for payment – to an examination that probes only the surface of his professional knowledge. “One can only conclude that the bureaucracy has been established with SIA collusion in a manner which maximises the income to commercial training organisations and undermines the theory that the SIA seeks to enhance standards and professionalism in the commercial sector”, (Name withheld, 2006).

Police priorities do not include securing academic or vocational qualifications for their staff even though they may train and operate at a level above qualifications standard and SIA regulation. Enquiries of ACPO to determine a future strategy have proved fruitless. “One can only surmise that commercial powers have conspired with others to regulate in a manner aimed to swell coffers by maximising the throughput of experienced former police and military in courses and examination in order that they ‘learn the language’ of the ‘outside’ world”.

The standards and concepts of the SIA with regards to the testing, examination and licensing process for the Close Protection sector have been compared and judged against that of Tactical Doctrine of the Royal Military Police Close Protection Unit and Met Police Royalty and Diplomatic Protection and the standards of the SAS. Recognised as the world’s experts and a benchmark to aspire to, a clear difference in standards is present between that of the MOD and Police, and that proposed and approved by the SIA and yet, those same Government courses are not recognised by the SIA and individuals are subsequently enforced to undertake derogatory ‘refresher’ training and examination at personal time and expense. To be put simply; Government courses are not accredited or approved for exemption of further ‘training’ or assessment by a body that reports directly to them. Mark Button, a senior lecturer with the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth and co-author of, ‘Private Security’, stated, “I would imagine all those categories of CP personnel you identify meet the competency requirements and would have hoped the SIA set up appropriate mechanisms to allow them through, subject to meeting the other licensing requirements: proof of id and character check. What they have set up seems very bureaucratic and a licence to print money for some bodies”, (Button: 2006).

Findings

The SIA have consulted with the commercial Close Protection industry as a result of lack of knowledge on the subject matter and the importance of obtaining knowledge, combined with and influenced by, contacts and relationships with commercial figures. It appears the SIA have either been naïve in their decision making process regarding the consulting of relevant experts, or have conflicting loyalties between that of Government, (working to obtain expert, unbiased, effective and accurate advice), and that of commercial companies. “In so far as the SIA addresses the quality of private security provision, it does so by reference to the commercial vales of ‘best practice’ and ‘competitiveness and effectiveness’ rather than articulated ethical standards. Improving the quality of security services is sold as a way to increase access to markets”, (Zedna: 2006).

I have found severe short falls and much wanting of the SIA from inception to ending with all matters concerning the Close Protection sector from selecting industry advisors regarding training and testing, to its policy and its subsequent licensing procedure. I have found that decisions have been based for commercial reasons and not in the best interests of individuals employed in the private security industry and indeed, prospective clientele. I have also found that the industry has been the advisors to the SIA and awarding bodies and that their own commercial concerns have been placed at the front of the line. As a direct consequence of advice and recommendations from biased sources, the impact of the introduction of ‘core-competencies’ and the licensing of the Close Protection sector is negligible, and that both the SIA and ‘Skills For Security’, have been ignorant of the true advisors from which information should have been sought.
“If a full, fit and proper system had been devised prior to attempting to license then the licensing would have been a far more robust system. If Quality Assurance systems had been put in to place and monitored independently then the quality would have been much higher”, (Name withheld: 2006).

Recommendations

An unscrupulous company can provide an unwitting civilian client with a so called CP professional simply on the basis that the individual has an SIA License. The potential for real danger in the UK on a day-to-day basis, although present, seldom arises. This gives the individual providing the service a false sense of ability and true market worth. It also provides the client with a false sense of security and a false impression that the service he/she has received has been excellent in every sense of the word including proper assessment of and preparations for risk mitigation. However, had the same client been attacked, they might have a different opinion of the service, if they were still alive to tell the tale that is. A worrying fact is that stood side by side, there is no way for a civilian client to determine the capability and experience of their CP officer if their judgement is made simply on a SIA badge. There should be a transparent tier system, whether that be colour coding badges, CV tracking or other system, but one which allows potential clients to view and determine for themselves exactly what they are getting for their money, rather than imposing someone on them with a badge anyone can get if they can afford it.

The SIA was set up to introduce, license, implement and regulate standards across the CP industry, and yet these standards can still be improved upon in 2 distinct and essentially important core areas; ‘Advanced Driving and ‘Reaction to Attack, (unarmed combat for UK)’. Whatever reason for their omission, one cannot ignore or disregard such topics as they are the underpinning doctrine of Close Protection operations and amending the core competencies to include these subject matters would create a far higher impact of standards in CP within the UK as a whole.
With regards to and as a result of, the SIA’s stipulation of ex-members of specialist CP units being subjected to examination and assessment in order to be licensed, a philosophical division has been created between the SIA and those serving with the Police Protection Command, RMP and the SAS. If currency of employment within CP of a 3 year period can be proved by members of such elite units then the acquisition of a SIA CP license should result in a form filling exercise, or indeed be automatically given on satisfactory completion of their respective CP courses. It is the correct way, it the fairest way, and it is the transparent way.

Conclusion

This research has been undertaken due to the subject matter being based on the core ideals of the UK private security industry. It would appear that all licensing criteria is organised to accrue the largest possible revenue for the main UK security companies and SIA, and without satisfactory answers to questions posed will result in the SIA operating without the level of transparency one expects and who, one is assured. The state presents itself as facilitator, but appears as pimp, to the security industry. Regulation is sold as a ‘business opportunity’ and compliance as the means to ensuring profitability”.
In the telling words of the Security Industry Authority, ‘Good security is good for the whole business environment’, (SIA, 2006).

Training is vital for a CPO to operate and perform effectively in the work environment. Various fundamental aspects related to close protection training were identified during the research. Another key area was that of the licensing process for those who had previous training and experience within specialist government units
and who were bracketed with 2 commercial training companies.

I have scrutinised the licensing of CP, its limitations and effect on the sector, and accreditation of prior learning that was determined by a steering committee that was not made up of the governments own authority on such matters. The consequential shortfalls were then highlighted, identifying 4 recommendations as a solution and method to increase the standards that were initially implemented. These included a ‘Tier System’ of licensing that would provide a transparent method of showing the individuals training and experience for both industry and prospective clients, and Accreditation of Prior Learning that has a requirement and a duty to reflect past training and experience in its accurate state. At present, it does not conform to this ideal and if respect with licensing policy is to be gained, fairness needs to be embraced.

This post is no doubt sensitive to some parties but has shown observations of a different nature to the ones explored above. It is acknowledged that the SIA as a whole have had a demanding and troubled start, however, a deep philosophical divide has been created between the SIA and professional practitioners as a result of lack of knowledge and the mode adopted to gain that knowledge.

If the aim of the implementation of core competencies by the SIA was to raise standards then this must at least be welcomed - if only to state that these standards could (should) have been higher.



Rich H