When Defensive Tactics Become "Offensive"

Rich H

Scab,

I find it absolutely bewildering that you are 'backing up' the initial Expert & Steering Group. If I didn't know any better, I would believe that you were indeed on that panel or have some association with it or be associated with S4S or the sia themselves! I also find it absolutely comical how you claim the NOS '...was torn from their hands'!! Believe me, I have had conversations with Peter Consterdine and he never once claimed that. It's a shame as that would have been a perfect excuse for the mess we all find ourselves and the deeper mess of a reputation the SIA finds itself. Regarding Control and Restraint, it is just that - controlling and restraining. It is no good for CP. A proper programme of 'Unarmed Combat' is the correct direction for certain situations.

My research has discovered everything I had wanted to know of what went on in that room on those first days. Accreditation of Prior Learning, (APL), as I believe you raise above is another absolute travesty.

Your statement - "Withdrawing your influence and losing your chance to perhaps make a difference is not going to change anything", is not in line with all my efforts to implement change. There is little more I can do. When I was on the review panel earlier this year I could see immediately that the bureacracy involved with S4S and the SIA does not allow to make change. They kept claiming that the review was indeed just that, a review and so implementing changes to the NOS could not be undertaken. They even argued that you could not even mention the word 'Advanced' when considering driving for fear of suggesting a course - WTF? It was pathetic and I am glad I removed myself from the panel.

In answer to your questions and to clarify a few points...

During my research my aim was to answer 2 simple questions:

‘Were senior ranks of the Rmp, SAS, Met Police or other Government Departments conferred with during the decision making process?’

and

‘Did the SIA consult with the proper relevant experts in the field of Close Protection during the consultation phase for the implementation of licensing, and does the subsequent introduction of the licensing criteria by the SIA as a result have a measurable positive or negative impact within the private security industry?’

Accreditation of Prior Learning

Another important factor concerning decisions made is that although the licensing process does involve an ‘Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) and experience and is outlined by the SIA, (SIA: 2006), it does state however that;
“There are no QCA/ACCAC/QAA approved qualifications that can be considered as exemptions for the core competence training and assessment. Arrangements for exemptions and Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) are as follows:
1. Close Protection operatives who have previously received formal Close protection training and are currently employed in an operational close protection role should present themselves to an approved Training Centre with evidence of the training they have received. Depending on the date and content of the training they have taken and to what extent the training covered the learning objectives of the new Close Protection course for licensing, they will be directed to take either the full 150 hours full Close Protection Course or the 24 hour Guided Learning Hours Refresher Course.
2. Candidates who have completed formal close protection training from the organisations listed below and have remained in an operational close protection role, will be exempt from further training but will be required to take the knowledge test and a practical skills assessment.

 Special Air Service regiment Bodyguard Course
 Royal Military Police Close Protection Course
 Metropolitan Police Royalty Protection/Special Branch Close Protection Course
 Police National close protection courses including Northern Ireland
 Nemesis Group Close Protection Course
 phoenix close protection Course”

It is therefore evident that these exemptions, as ultimately decided upon by the SIA, have not only bracketed 2 commercial training companies with them thus implying similar high training standards and operational values but have disregarded the true professionalism and expertise of such specialist units as the SAS, RMP, or members of Police units serving under ‘Protection Command’. As a result and for example, it is now mandatory for individuals who have been trained and had experience of CP operations with any of these specialist units to sit a written examination and be practically assessed on their knowledge of the subject matter before they can receive a SIA Close Protection license and be allowed to be legally employed in a commercial environment in the UK. Whether it is members of the RMP or SAS having served as bodyguards to senior military Generals or Members of Parliament/ Heads of State in high risk locations; or members of the Police serving on the close protection teams for the Prime Minister or Royal Family; all must be assessed by individuals less qualified and less experienced. Exam paper questions for the CP license, a bank of some 200 questions, have been compiled by the same individuals with no formal training. At present, a serving member of the Royal Military Police Close protection Teams can conduct bodyguard duties to a British Ambassador but is advised to have to attend 24 hours of ‘refresher training’ over 3 days and then have to sit an exam, run by and written by civilians with no formal training before he/ she can legally be employed in a similar role in civilian life.

The following question was posed to the then Chief Executive, Skills for Security, Linda Sharpe, and who was head of the steering committee during the consultation phase for licensing the Close Protection sector;

“Is it not right that change needs to be implemented due to specialist personnel trained to the highest degree in a specific discipline that are employed by the British Governments Foreign & Commonwealth Office for the protection of its Ambassadors, Members of Parliament, Heads of State, and yet are having to sit an assessment to claim their CP license? Is their level of training, expertise and experience at question?”

“No I cannot agree with this statement in its entirety. I would not disagree about the high training standards and levels of expertise that are achieved in both service and police training for CP work but this is specialist work within a specialist environment with all the safeguards of refresher training built in. The requirements of the SIA are for the civilian marketplace, restricted at the moment to England and Wales. So a very different environment and for CP operatives who do not have the powers that are divested to either the military or the police”, (‘Skills For Security’: 2006).

Close Protection courses held within the military do, and have to, cater for all environments. The environment can constantly change and therefore personnel are trained to adapt. Whether they are operational in a suit with a covert carriage of weapons or whether they carry overt wearing uniform, the core practise and methods of operation seldom change. It is the outward appearance, the 'image stamp' of the team that changes. The Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ statement contradicts that of the Ministry of Defence, (Army), concerning the RMP CP course; “The aim of the course is to train Service Police men or women to perform close protection duties in any environment”, (MOD, 2006). 'Safeguards' such as refresher training as the Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ refers to within the military or police framework, is concentrated on firearms, unarmed combat, driving and medical, of which only the latter bears any relationship to the 'core competence's stipulated by the SIA, and far outweighs any ‘First Aid at Work’ or First Person on Scene’ medical course as recognised by the SIA, as they include intravenous infusion and the use of defibrillators amongst other procedures. One must also accept that those trained to the highest level would quite easily be able to adapt and operate in a less demanding, less challenging environment with less tension, but certainly not vice versa.

The main reasoning stated by the SIA not to fully recognise the training by the RMP, SAS or Police and consider them as exempted from the core competence training and assessment is that those military or police qualifications are not QCA/ ACCAC/ QAA approved. There is nothing alarming or surprising with this statement as it is widely known that many military courses do not have a civilian equivalent. However, research was undertaken with the QCA directly with startling results; “The Qualifications Curriculum Authority does not have to approve the courses run by these agencies. The SIA could decide themselves if their course content maps that of the core competencies required by the SIA”, (Harris, Connelly, QCA, 2006). Could it be that the SIA are very much aware of this and yet instil an ‘It is not our responsibility’ attitude to the process?

One would naturally assume that the introduction of licensing Close Protection in the UK would merely present a paper exercise for those with such backgrounds. One would also assume that these units would have been approached for advice during the consultation phase on licensing CP. This indeed, for the most part, is not the case.

Senior Staff of the SIA at the time consisted of a Chief Executive and 5 board members, none of which have had any significant career history of responsibility associated with the private security industry. Backgrounds include corporate banking, IT, BAA, Prison Service, Police Complaints Authority and Director of Personnel for Vauxhall Motors, (SIA: 2006). Indeed, as reiterated, knowledge or experience concerning matters of a Close Protection nature was also non-existent within the SIA and so the importance of the formation of a steering committee was under-lined in order to devise the standards and testing required. One would quite rightly assume that in such an important step in the complexity surrounding this discipline that the experts of this profession would be first approached. Experts that could produce information, advice and recommendations concerning the standards to be adopted that would be accurate, effective and unbiased. After all, the SIA is a Government body; why not approach the relevant Government experts?

The Chief Executive of ‘Skills For Security’ and head of the consultation committee of the SIA at the time stated that this did indeed occur; “RMP, 22SAS and Met Police were all actively involved in the consultation process which took place in 2004/2005”.


Great! Lets just confirm that one...

“The SIA have not consulted with us regarding the licensing of CP on any level. We have not received any paperwork whatsoever concerning this matter”, (Capt DM, Royal Military Police Close Protection Unit, 2006).

“I have investigated whether we had received any communiqué from the SIA concerning either consulting with us regarding Close Protection or providing information on the licensing process. This has all met with negative results”, (Maj SP, RMP CPU, 2006).

“The SIA have never consulted us. There is great concern from us with the SIA and the way they do things”, (SSGT CT, RMP CPU, 2006).

“The SIA have not contacted us for any advice or information concerning Close Protection. We have also not hosted any liaison or conducted meetings with any members of the SIA”, (Jon, 22 SAS, 2006).

With regards to the Police presence on the ‘steering committee’; “Training exemptions were decided in my absence and "appeared" in the SIA blurb. Yes, there were discussions but no conclusions in open forum of which I was aware”, (Name withheld: 2006)

These statements contradict that given by the head of the consultation committee and also those of the SIA, “We stand by our original response to your question that we consulted widely with the listed agencies and we are confident that those representing their fields were at the required level. We can add nothing further to our answer”.

An important contradiction given the total relevance of the subject matter and one that required an exact answer to understand the decisions made. The question posed; ‘Were specialist units such as the Royal Military Police, 22 SAS and Met Police protection units consulted directly during the decision making process in the 'consultation phase' and not by persons on the 'steering committee' who claimed to have worked in such units?’ It is worthy to note that the initial email reply given to this question was, “I am extremely busy at the moment but I will try and answer your questions within a week”, (Chief Executive, ‘Skills For Security’: 2006). An electronic tracker was placed on the email posing the initial question. During the following 6 days, the email was forwarded and opened in correspondence 34 times by 6 readers including members of the SIA and ‘Skills For Security’. Is it that this line of questioning caused concern?

It is fact that the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis holds the national responsibility for the personal protection within the UK of members of the Royal Family, HM Government and also for visiting heads of state, and specified government representatives. This is discharged through the Royalty Protection Department and Specialist Protection (formerly Special Branch). The (Cabinet Office) Executive Committee for the Protection of Royalty and Public Figures (RAVEC), with its Home Office, (Terrorism & Protection Unit (TPU)) lead, determines which individuals are protected and agrees appropriate security measures.

There is no little confidence in those who perform this specialist role; and the specialist training given to officers selected for these duties is over and above their powers as Constables and their experience in street duties and frequently other specialisms. They seek support from, and lead operations, with police forces throughout the UK, enjoy intelligence flows with diverse agencies, diplomatic representatives and appropriate organisations when overseas.

It is fair to opine, therefore, that the levels of professionalism and the tactical application of protection skills within the disciplined and “not for profit” police environment are of the highest order. Little surprise then, that a police representative – to represent the Police Standards & Skills Organisation (PSSO) – was invited to the consultation foray when national occupational standards (NOS) and training elements were to be determined by the SIA. Important to note, that this ‘representative’ had no remit to represent the views of the Commissioner or the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), but sought to “assist” the process – as opposed to “steer” - and to respond to any areas in which police specialist training or standards may be surpassed by the commercial (SIA) proposals. “Leaving specialist firearms, first aid, driving and knowledge of criminal law and procedure aside (not to mention operational experience in the eye of the national and international media), there was of course, no compromise”, (Name withheld, 2006).

Anecdotal evidence supports the military conclusions: police are trained to operate at a level far in excess of the SIA standards. Yet, an experienced officer, who has been charged with the personal protection of the Prime Minister in the UK and overseas, is security cleared in compliance with government vetting standards, is an accredited police trainer and ‘Cert Ed’, is not qualified to apply for the SIA licence without submitting himself – for payment – to an examination that probes only the surface of his professional knowledge. “One can only conclude that the bureaucracy has been established with SIA collusion in a manner which maximises the income to commercial training organisations and undermines the theory that the SIA seeks to enhance standards and professionalism in the commercial sector”, (Name withheld, 2006).

Police priorities do not include securing academic or vocational qualifications for their staff even though they may train and operate at a level above qualifications standard and SIA regulation. Enquiries of ACPO to determine a future strategy have proved fruitless. “One can only surmise that commercial powers have conspired with others to regulate in a manner aimed to swell coffers by maximising the throughput of experienced former police and military in courses and examination in order that they ‘learn the language’ of the ‘outside’ world”, (Name withheld, 2006).

The importance of driving within the Close Protection World cannot be overstated. A large percentage of operational time is spent in vehicles and the conveyance of a Principal exposes them to risks of a safety nature thus increasing the number of risks as a whole, either direct or indirect, that are/ could be presented. The role of close protection driver therefore is vitally important. Police and RMP Driving Schools utilise a system of car control referred to as Roadcraft. Driving safety and driving skill are aspects of the same ability – the ability to control the position and speed of your vehicle relative to everything else on the road. An accident or even a near miss usually represents a loss of this control – a lapse in driving skill. The role of Close Protection Driver within the Police is deemed important enough that the individual, although not in every case, but even though trained, does not carry a firearm. The reasoning behind such decisions is that should a ‘contact’ situation present itself, the driver should be concerned with driving and not with returning fire. CPO’s who are operating in the role as driver should be trained in how to:

• Identify hazards whilst driving in convoy
• Demonstrate effective observation skills
• Use safe driving techniques
• Correctly position a vehicle during convoy or Vip duties
• Approach and position a vehicle at venue locations correctly
• Use a vehicle defensively
• Search a vehicle for suspect packages
• Avoid ambush
• Plan a route and map read to principal venues

According to ‘Skills For Security’ and the SIA, driving within the role of Close Protection is not deemed important to be made mandatory training and is not listed in the core competencies one should attain. It does however, mention the use of ‘close- protection vehicle techniques’ but this specialist area is unbalanced in the list when one considers that basic driving skills should be first improved upon before one conducts such training. Another confusing aspect is that ‘PCP 7, National Occupational Standards’, does contain the heading, ‘Maintain the safety and security of Principal’s whilst in transit’, but only under the subject heading of, ‘Surveillance Awareness’, (SIA: 2006), and no where does it refer to the standard of driving to be attained. It is imperative to note that ‘Driving Skills’ is listed with ‘Physical Intervention Skills’; as ‘Skills for Employment’ and not as part of any mandatory SIA core competencies, and therefore not obligatory.

During the SIA ‘Consultation phase’, a steering committee was formed with representatives from industry, (Commercial CP training and operation providers), and the Police. Members of this committee included directors from ‘Nemesis Group Ltd, (John Porsche), Phoenix CP, (Mick Clifford) and CTR Services, (Tremaine Kent), amongst others. Peter Consterdine, Joint Chief Instructor of The British Combat Association was also conferred with. The main underlying phenomena is that the directors of these companies and others have no proper Close Protection training or experience themselves. Indeed, both Nemesis and Phoenix CP, although have directors from an RMP and SAS background respectively, they themselves have not attended their relevant units Close Protection or Bodyguard course, and yet have provided advice and recommendations concerning training and licensing this specialist sector. Questions were posed to the director of Phoenix CP concerning the clarification of his background and how he came to sit on the committee during the consultation phase, to which he refused to comment. The Director of CTR Services, “…was invited to sit on the steering committee by Alan Martin, a member of SITO, (S4S), who was responsible for developing the National Occupational Standards, for the SIA licensing of the sector”. The Director of CTR Services is also now the chairman for Skills for Security for Close Protection. Peter Consterdine is a 7th Dan Black Belt in Karate, and a former Great Britain and England Karate International. He was an instructor for Excel Security Ltd and is Operations and Training Director of his own risk management and security company, Chase Consultants Limited. He attended a civilian CP course with ‘CQB Services’ in 1986.
The Close Protection National Occupational Standards, (NOS), were established by S4S, (SITO), and from this, the core competencies determined that must be covered by training providers on Close Protection courses.
Peter Consterdine stated, “The 'steering' committee for CP didn't exist as such and was essentially, divided into 2 parts. The first part was the establishment of CP National Occupational Standards (NOS) and this was driven by SITO. They simply 'dusted off' an earlier work on this that I and some other people had put together in 1994/5. They circulated the new proposal to a number of people - the extent of which I don't know and only at the tail end did I get to see them and comment as there were some issues I wasn't happy with. Eventually, SITO went firm on the NOS which were approved by the Co-ordinating Group on 23 Nov 2004. From here, the second stage of the process began, which was for SITO to turn the NOS into Training Core Competencies”, (Consterdine, 2006).

Here, we can see then that the SIA had formed a steering committee for the consultation phase consisting of individuals, who either had a predominantly martial arts background, (and whose main CP experience was an instructor on the infamous 'Excel Security' course, as was the author of 'The Bodyguards Bible'), directors of commercial companies who it was either believed or assumed had specialist related protection backgrounds but in fact on the contrary, and also members who were simply invited to sit.

Indeed, it appears that anyone who knew anyone could invite them to sit. “The main players all advised the SIA and awarding bodies during the set up phase - in reality the SIA would have been much better off talking to the RMP through the MOD as there would have been no agendas at all”, (Name withheld, 2006).


The position where the UK CP industry is today and the reason why we are discussing this matter is simple. I had found severe short falls and much wanting of the SIA from inception to ending with all matters concerning the Close Protection sector from selecting industry advisors regarding training and testing, to its policy and its subsequent licensing procedure. I had found that decisions have been based for commercial reasons and not in the best interests of individuals employed in the private security industry and indeed, prospective clientele. I had also found that the industry has been the advisors to the SIA and awarding bodies and that their own commercial concerns have been placed at the front of the line. As a direct consequence of advice and recommendations from biased sources, the impact of the introduction of ‘core-competencies’ and the licensing of the Close Protection sector is negligible, and that both the SIA and ‘Skills For Security’, have been ignorant of the true advisors from which information should have been sought.
If a full, fit and proper system had been devised prior to attempting to license then the licensing would have been a far more robust system. If Quality Assurance systems had been put in to place and monitored independently then the quality would have been much higher.

Now, you can throw flowers and perfume on this mess to tart it up and claim things like "torn from their hands", but you will never hide the overiding smell of the truth.

We are where we are due to the poor advice given by the commercial influence - SIMPLE.

We are where we are due to the commercial influence on this industry and the collaboration of industry figures with the SIA - FACT.


Rich H

jmaccauley

Rich H, you gotta learn to speak your mind and not hold yourself back so much.
On a serious note, it is refreshing to see that bureaucracy rules in the UK as much, if not more so, than here in the US.

Jerry

Rich H

Very funny Jerry, very funny!


Rich H

James Mc

Rich,

Bloody good read mate, i always wondered why two commercial companies were given execmption from doing the course!!

I think after the panorama programme in Jan of this year (which made me pmsl at the CEO of the sia flounder through questions which made him & his organisation look like a bunch of clowns) & the pressure being brought upon the goverment things may start happening.

Perhaps the next stage is to contact the Conservatives, love them or hate them, they will be the next Govt! (would be a rather nice cat to throw amongst the pidgeons for them to throw in the face the present Govt)

Lets be proactive & not reactive on this.

James Mc

Rich H

To be perfectly honest James,

I am exhausted from camapigning, protesting and recommending that I'm all out of fizz. I have resigned to the fact that this is what has happened, we are where we are as a result and I shall be writing a book to tell everyone how to do CP the proper way and not the way as stipulated by the sia. I will then outline everything concerning the manner in which the SIA was formed, the manner in which the NOS and APL were decided and then, only then will I be content.

I don't need a lisense to work but there is no way I am going to stand on the street with my Boss next to an 'untrained and inexperienced civvi' that has a license anyone can get if they can afford it.

An unscrupulous company can provide an unwitting civilian client with a so called CP professional simply on the basis that the individual has an SIA License. The potential for real danger in the UK on a day-to-day basis, although present, seldom arises. This gives the individual providing the service a false sense of ability and true market worth. It also provides the client with a false sense of security and a false impression that the service he/she has received has been excellent in every sense of the word including proper assessment of and preparations for risk mitigation. However, had the same client been attacked, they might have a different opinion of the service, if they were still alive to tell the tale that is. A worrying fact is that stood side by side, there is no way for a civilian client to determine the capability and experience of their CP officer if their judgement is made simply on a SIA badge. There should be a transparent tier system, whether that be colour coding badges, CV tracking or other system, but one which allows potential clients to view and determine for themselves exactly what they are getting for their money, rather than imposing someone on them with a badge anyone can get if they can afford it.

There you go, you started me off again...


Rich H

Scab

Rich,

If I said I was a member of one of the groups would you take my first hand experience over what you have been told? Or would you just rubbish me?

Onward:

Peter Consterdine was not involved with the expert group and to the best of my knowledge, his name features on none of the steering group meetings minutes I have read. How he can claim such intimate knowledge of the steering group if he never was a part of it is in itself bewildering. And they were not torn from the hands of those who developed them. When the document was finished it was taken by the sia and QCA and they did with it what they did that resulted with what we ended up with today.

You yourself have witnessed the attitude they have. Why do you think it was any different for the original development group?

As I am aware the Rmp CPU was approached but declined involvement at the initial stages.

The SAS CP involvement was apparently by proxy of the reps of Phoenix CP and rightly or wrongly it was also determined that the level of CP provided by the regiment and to some extent the RMP CP teams was at a level far and above that which would be required of civilians on the UK market. Is there really no disparity you see between the private Circuit and the military CP teams? Its two wholly different contexts of protection.

"Unarmed combat"
Was at no level a term that anyone on the government side was prepared to put into a government sanctioned document because of the inferral that the government would then be approving civillians engaging in unarmed combat with one another. Again, profoundly frustrating for all concerned but this is the system the UK has.

Its an example of the same bureaucracy you yourself faced on the review panel that could make no amendments.

Regards the old NOS draft being dusted off; I have heard of this happening and it was only as a comparison and to have a look at what the previous notion was. If I can get a hold of the first ever proposal Ill happily send it to you so you can compare the two, they are quite different documents.

Metropolitan police influence on the expert group was a lot more significant than you suggest; there were two individuals who put a lot of information into the drafts; one Rpg and one SB with significant experience. I appreciate thats only two; but its still contrary to what your information seems to suggest.

A point I would like to put to you is how it seems the backgrounds of the steering panel can be so widely known; what are the sources of this information which is so consise it can be determined that the men who set so many aspects of the commercial CP training industry have no operational experience themselves? I don't know either way so I am certainly not defending them before you leap on that, its an objective question.

A general consideration you might like to consider; is that across the industry the courses developed by the individuals who formed the Expert and Steering groups are widely regarded as fit for purpose and all have had operators who have gone on to do very well on the circuit both here in the UK and worldwide.
To that end much of the NOS development would be taken on the syllabus' of said companies who have put effective operators on the ground.

Have the not proven their understanding of the requirements of CP by virtue of this?

Apparently its been alright for years; yet put it on paper and make it official and suddenly its not? Most established companies training changed very little when the NOS became officially stamped; merely evolving to take on the new elements such as Conflict Management.

As for the sad state of affairs where the training has fallen from four weeks to an average of two, the original demand on time was 300 hours, the QCA decided that for a level 3 qual; 150 was fine.

I thank you for posting up some excellent information, some of which I was not previously aware of and do take on board. The commercial influences I draw the same conclusion as yourself on.

But I've got to point out the information I have which contrasts with your beleif. Chiefly; I wonder why you are so against the NOS that the key players in training put together when the biggest influence on it came from the SIA & QCA. And I also wonder why you are so closed to any of the information I have put to you. There are two sides to every coin.

And as I am sure you are aware there are some spectacular myths and legends bouncing around the industry about how things have panned out by people who have no exposure to these processes than what they heard on the jungle drums.

I am unhappy myself with the way the NOS draft was handled after the wider consultation was finished; since thats when it was the major decisions were made by the SIA. I hate the PC and the beurocracy that its all been riddled with.

The end product is what you make it of when all is said and done, a guide. If half the industry was as smart as it likes to think it is, this would be realised and the best would be made of a bad situation.

Aside from that, you yourself have experienced the same frustrations as were experienced by the original development groups. Do you still attribute all the blame to them knowing what they had to work in?